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This study was conducted (1) to substantiate previous
research findings that the effectiveness of the manipu
lative behavior of high Machiavellians can be reduced
by instructions to low Machiavellians and (2) to deter
mine if this reduction holds over time or whether high
Machiavellians are able to recover and once more become
successful manipulators. Fifty-four female subjects,
eighteen each of high, middle, and low Machiavellian
orientation, played the Con Game in an effort to win
points.
In the control condition, the game was played
according to the original instructions with no additional
manipulation. Prior to the experimental sessions, how
ever, low Machiavellians were given counter-Machiavellian
instructions relative to the true nature of the experiment
and then were allowed to proceed according to the original
instructions. Although it had been hypothesized that low
Machiavellians in the experimental group would initially
score more points .in the Con Game than high Machiavellians
and would sustain the advantage, analysis of variance of
the data indicated that no significant differences in
point accumulation were found for high or lox\r Machiavel
lians throughout the games in either the experimental or
control condition. Experimental subjects did, however,
reject significantly more proposals to form coalitions in
the game than control subjects (p <.01).
Likewise, more
proposals x^ere made to subjects in the experimental group
over the control group (p <06) and it was found that low
Machiavellians in the control group broke more proposals
(p<_.07) at an inopportune time, xdiile in the experimental
group, high Machiavellians made the same error more fre
quently. Thus, although no significant differences in
overall point accumulation in the Con Game were noted for
high and low Machiavellians, a significant effect of the
experimental manipulation was demonstrated.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Purpose of Study
Research has demonstrated that individuals with a strong
Machiavellian orientation, when placed in certain situations,
are able to continually manipulate or manage the behavior of
others who have less of a Machiavellian orientation.

When

given prior information about what to expect, however, it
.appears that low Machiavellian subjects are able, for at
least a short time, to resist manipulation effectively.

The

purpose of the present investigation was, then, twofold:
1. An attempt was made to substantiate previous re
search findings that the effectiveness of the
manipulative behavior of high Machiavellians
can be reduced by instructions to low Machs.
2. An attempt was made to determine if this re
duction would hold over time or whether high
Machiavellians would be able to recover and
once again become successful manipulators.
Introduction to Machiavellian Research
With the publication of The Prince in 1532, Machiavelli
presented a view of man as characterized by guile, deceit,
1
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and opportunism in interpersonal relations.

The term

"Machiavellian," then, became associated with those people
who view and manipulate others for their own purposes.
Although the concept of Machiavellianism dates well
back into history, it has only been recently that this phe
nomenon has come to the attention of experimentally-oriented
social scientists.

One of the first to attempt experimental

examination of this topic was Richard Christie, a psychologist
from Columbia University.

Through study of Machiavelli1s

works, Christie hypothesized that certain specific traits
would characterize the Machiavellian individual.

These in

clude a relative lack of affect in interpersonal relation
ships, a lack of concern with conventional morality, a lack
of gross psychopathology, and a low ideological commitment
(Christie, 1970a).

From this, Christie developed the Mach

Scales (Mach l'V and Mach V) for the purpose of identifying
those individuals with high and low Machiavellian orienta
tion.
Mach IV (see Appendix A) consists of a twenty item
Likert format scale in which ten items are keyed to endorse
ment of Machiavellian statements and ten are keyed in the
opposite direction to avoid the problem of acquiescent
response style.

The items themselves are paraphrased

statements taken directly from Machiavelli*s writings.

Due

to the apparent high correlation between this scale and the
scales of social desirability, however (Budner, 1962), Mach V

3

was constructed (see Appendix B) in an attempt to reduce the
effects of social desirability.

Mach V also is made up of

twenty items, each consisting of three statements of which
the respondent must choose the one most true of his own
beliefs and the one most false.
is identical to Mach IV items.

One statement in each item
Since the statements have

been matched for social desirability, this forced-choice
technique makes it difficult for the average respondent to
determine which is the socially '’correct” answer.
Research by Geis, Weinheimer, and Berger (1966) indi
cated that the reliability of Mach IV is in the .70's while
that of Mach V averages in the .60's.

Lowin (1966) found

retest reliability (from three weeks to two months) to be
+.70 for Mach IV and +.59 for Mach V.

CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
Personality Correlates
Since the development of the Mach Scales, research on
Machiavellianism has extended in many directions, making it
difficult to distinguish any single explicit trend of study.
However, it appears that much effort has been given to the
correlation of specific personality variables with Machia
vellianism.

For example, a factor analytic study conducted

by Wrightsman and Cook (1965) indicated that manifest hos
tility, anomie, verbal hostility, anti-police attitude, and
suspicion were significantly related to Machiavellianism.
A negative correlation was demonstrated between faith in
human nature and a high Mach orientation.

In comparing

Mach IV responses of both male and female college students
with a scale designed to measure philosophy of human nature,
Wrightsman (1964) found that Machiavellianism was signifi
cantly negatively correlated, with trustworthiness, altruism,
independence, and strength of will.

No relationship was

demonstrated between a belief in the complexity and vari
ability of human nature and Machiavellianism.
A number of studies have been conducted in an attempt
4
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to correlate Machiavellianism with measures of intellectual
ability.

Christie (1970b) reported that the Verbal scores

on the Medical College Admission Test (MCAT), given to 161
medical students, showed no significant correlation with
Machiavellianism.

Likewise, intelligence aptitude scores

for 115 students at Columbia University were not related
to their Mach IV and Mach V scores.

Singer (1964) reported

that in a sample of 994 entering students at Pennsylvania
State University, no significant correlation was found be
tween Mach V scores and the Moore-Castore tests of intel
lectual aptitude.

However, the fact that no standardized

data were available for this locally constructed test re
duces the generality of this study.

Wrightsman and Cook

(1964) attempted to correlate the Mach IV scores of 177
female college students with the individual
the Guilford-Zimmerman Abilities Test.

subtests of

None of the correla

tions were significant at the .05 level.

It appears then

that intellectual ability is not related to Machiavellianism,
s

at least for such intellectually homogeneous subjects.

It

should be noted, however, that this homogeneity may have
operated to reduce the magnitude of the correlations re
ported in these studies.
Two studies have explored the relationship betx^een
Machiavellianism and need for achievement.

Weinstock (1964)

administered Strodtbeck’s (1958) eight-item achievement
scale and nine items from the Mach IV Scale to fifty
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Hungarian refugees.

A correlation of +.29, significant at

the .05 level, was found.

Geis, Weinheimer, and Berger

(1966) gave fifty-four college male subjects a ten-item
test of need for achievement.

The results of this test

were found to correlate -.03 with Mach scores.

The fact

that American subjects were used in the latter research as
well as the administration of the total Mach Scale, may give
greater validity to the Geis

et al. study.

However, at

present, the only conclusion that seems warranted is that
more research is needed to determine the relationship of
Machiavellianism to need for achievement.
With regard to authoritarianism, several studies have
attempted to show a relationship between this characteris
tic and Machiavellianism by examining F-Scale and Mach Scale
scores,

Christie (1970b) reported that in 1955-56 he ad

ministered the Mach Scales and F-Scales to nine groups (four
classes of medical students and five of college undergrad
uates) of subjects.
was found.

No correlation between the two scales

In 1964, however, the same procedure, adminis

tered to 1782 college students, yielded a statistically
significant correlation of -.20.

Christie accounted for

this discrepancy over time by referring to the increasing
sophistication of society and to the increase in test
sophistication of more recent students, making them less
prone to agree with F-Scale items.

However, he also sug

gested the possibility that Mach scores are increasing over
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time.

Again, it appears that more research is needed to

determine what, if any, trends are occurring in this regard.
In attempting to assess the political preferences of
high Machs and high F-Scale scorers, Wrightsman, Radloff,
Horton, and Mecherikoff (1961) gave a battery of scales
(including Mach IV) to college students before the 1960
election.

Results indicated that high F-Scale individuals

significantly favored a Republican orientation.

However,

no relationship was found between preference for a partic
ular political party and Machiavellianism, which was inter
preted as congruent with the hypothesized low ideological
commitment of high Machs,
Primavera and Higgins (1973) correlated the scores of
104 undergraduates on the Breskin Test of Non-verbal Rigid
ity, the Rokeach Dogmatism Scale, and Christie's Mach Scale.
They found that non-verbal rigidity was not related to
either Machiavellianism or dogmatism but that dogmatism
showed a low, positive relationship (significant at the
.05 level) to Machiavellianism.
To explore racial attitudes among high Machiavellians,
Wrightsman and Cook'(1965) used white, southern college
women as subjects.

No relationship was found between a

Machiavellian orientation and measures of racial attitude.
However, there was a significant tendency for these Machi
avellian women to stereotype indiscriminantly both whites
and blacks.

It would be interesting to replicate this
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study using males or northerners as subjects to determine
if similar results obtain.
Using the same subjects as in the study above, Wrights
man and Cook (1964) also attempted to correlate Machiavellian
ism with scales on the MMPI.

They found a correlation of -.27

between Mach IV and the K-Scale (a measure of test-taking
defensiveness) on the MMPI.

Similarly, the Lie Scale of the

MMPI correlated -.40 with Machiavellianism.

If these find

ings can be generalized, they suggest that high Mach scorers
give relatively fewer positive self-references than the gen
eral population when taking tests and that they are rela
tively sophisticated with regard to statements concerning
themselves.
Harris (1966) attempted to examine how Machiavellians
evaluate others.

Employing seventy-six male subjects, he

had each subject interact separately with a high Mach and a
low Mach on the task of rating characters in Waiting for
'Godot (Beckett, 1954).

Later, using a semantic differential,

each subject was asked to rate a partner.

It was found

that high Machs rated their partner significantly lower on
"good” qualities than did low Machs.

These data strongly

suggest that the negative view taken by high Machs of their
fellow man is not restricted to general statements that show
up on tests, but is also true of ratings made of actual per
sons with whom they have just interacted.

9

Rosenblatt and Hannum (1969) examined the relationship
between Machiavellianism and sociopathy using females in a
penal institution as subjects.

They were given the Mach IV

Scale, the .Mach V Scale, and the Coalition-Triad Game, as
well as peer and self ratings to determine Machiavellian
orientation.

To assess tendencies toward sociopathy, the

women were given selected MMPI scales and the Lykken Scale.
In addition, judgments by institutional psychologists and
biographical data were utilized.

Results indicated no sig

nificant relationship between sociopathic tendencies and
Mach iave11ian ism.
In an attempt to experimentally assess the ability of
Machiavellians to manipulate others, Geis, Christie, and
Nelson (1970) designed a rather complex study.

High and

low Machs were individually tested by a confederate on an
embedded figures test.

Later the subjects were told that

their experimenter (the confederate) had performed some
deceptions when giving them feedback.

The subjects were

then asked to test a subject (another confederate) on the
same measure and were told that they could be as deceptive
as they wished.

Results indicated that high Machs were

significantly more manipulative than low Machs in both
number and variety of manipulative techniques.

Furthermore,

high Machs were more innovative in their manipulations and,
according to later questionnaires, enjoyed the manipulation
more.

It was found, however, that high Machiavellians were
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neither more punitive nor more suggestible than low Machs.
A number of studies have been concerned with opinion
change as related to various degrees of Machiavellianism.
Jones, Gergen, and Davis (1963) found that high Machs were
relatively unaffected by positive or negative feedback about
their personalities while low Machs changed significantly in
the direction of giving positive self-descriptions after
receiving a negative evaluation of their personality.

Harris

(1966), in assessing judgment independence, found that high
Machs did not change their ratings of fictional characters
when confronted with dissimilar ratings by others.

Low Machs,

on the other hand, shifted to agree more with their partner.
Feiler £1967) engaged high and low Mach subjects in two

de

bates in one of which each subject was forced to defend

an

issue contrary to his own belief.

Attitude change ratings

suggested that low Machs changed their position after both
consonant and dissonant debates, while high Machiavellians
showed no significant change in either situation.

From

this research, it can be speculated that Machiavellians
are relatively impervious to external influence.
Game Playing Behavior
Another emphasis in Machiavellian research has been
placed on competitive game playing behavior of high and
low Machs.

Cne of the frequently used games is the Con

Ga?ne developed by Geis (1964), xvhich attempts to measure
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success at manipulating others.

In an initial study utiliz

ing this game, Geis (1970) used sets of three players--a
high Mach, a middle Mach, and a low Mach.

Degree of ambig

uity and degree of power were varied in this competitive
game situation.

It was found that high Machs outbargained

lows and consistently won more points in the game.

Simi

larly, highs were even more successful when the bargaining
situation was more ambiguous, but highs failed to increase
their success more than lows did with an increase in power
position in the groups.

It appears, then, that Machiavel

lians are able to successfully manipulate others.

What, is

more, they are best able to exploit their manipulative
talents in relatively ambiguous situations.
An attempt to replicate the above study, as well as
assess the affects of social desirability on Machiavellian
ism, was made by Doctor (1969).

She not only found'no

significant relationship between social desirability and
Machiavellianism, but was also unable to obtain a signifi
cant Machiavellian effect.

Clearly, these results do not

support Geis* hypothesis that Machiavellianism accounts for
the variance among game scores.

Doctor commented, however,

that some methodological problems, as well as the small num
ber of subjects utilized, may have seriously limited the
generalizability of these results.
In the Ten Dollar Game, Christie and Geis (1970)
examined the situation where the stakes were more tangible.
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Again, results indicated that high Machs won overwhelmingly.
It was proposed that the real stakes made the situation more
serious which, while not affecting the high Machs, put lows
at a disadvantage since a moral conflict may have been
initiated due to the greater emotional value of the game.
Another game x^hich has been devised to assess Machiavel
lian behavior is the Penny-Dollar Game (Christie, Gergen,
and Marlowe, 1970), a variation of Prisoner's Dilemma.

Here,

each subject believes himself to be dependent upon another
person in order to accumulate winnings.

In this situation,

high Machiavellians took a more cooperative rather than
exploitive point of view, thus allowing both partners sup
posedly to collect substantial winnings.

The authors con

cluded that the high Mach is a very rational game player.
Similarly, results of questionnaires demonstrate that high
Machs view others as they perceive themselves and so believe
others to be fully capable of utilizing exploitive techniques.
Thus, it is speculated that rather than risk retaliation
from their partner for their own exploitation, the high Machs
believed that in this case cooperation was more fruitful than
mutual exploitation.
In line with the Machiavellian's hypothesized ration
ality, a Legislature Game was developed to explicitly test
the effect of emotionality on game outcome (Geis, Weinheimer,
and Berger, 1966).

Here, subjects were asked to make speeches

concerning neutral, consonant, and dissonant issues in the
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hopes of gaining votes from other players.

Results indicate

that when neutral issues were involved, both low and high
Machs received an equal number of votes.

On emotionally

loaded issues, however,^high Machs significantly outscored
lows.

The authors

hypothesize that the rationality of

Machiavellians kept them from being distracted by emotional
issues.

Lows, however, became emotionally involved in the

issues and thus were more easily distracted.
Other games devised to study Machiavellianism include
a variation of dominos (Edelstein, 1966) and the Products
Game (Hornstein and Deutsch, 1967).

In general, the outcomes

of game research with Machiavellians tend to be consistent-high Mach subjects generally win and appear to become less
involved in emotional issues which arise during play.

One

notable exception is a study by Wahlin (1967) who, using a
variation of the Prisoner's Dilemma Game, found that high
Machs consistently lost more points than low Machs.

How

ever, in this situation, the "partner," a pre-programmed
fictional opponent, tended to become vindictive when the
subject became aggressive.

Since high Machs were more aggres

sive and competitive than lows, they tended to lose more
points overall.

These results appear to be contradictory to

those described in the Penny-Dollar Game research (Christie,
Gergen, and Marlowe, 1970) where high Machs took a relatively
cooperative stand.

Apparently, further research is needed

to determine the nature of this discrepancy.

14

Antecedents of Machiavellianism
Recently, several studies have emerged which explore
the antecedents of Machiavellianism.

O ’Kelley and Solar

(1971) attempted to correlate parental orientations toward
Machiavellianism with similar attitudes in their children.
They found that high Mach parents tended to have high Mach
children while low Mach parents had low Mach offspring.
They hypothesize that social modeling is responsible for
the emergence of a Machiavellian attitude.

Touhey (1973),

however, suggested that Machiavellianism arises from a
failure to identify with parents.

His findings suggested

that only minimal support can be given to the hypothesis
that children learn Machiavellianism from their parents or
other family models.

Rather, he concluded that Machiavel

lianism emerges from sources outside the family.

At pre

sent, much more research needs to be conducted on this
issue.

It seems likely, however, that the origins of

Machiavellianism are rather complex and may arise from
various combinations of parental attitudes and external
experiences.
Summary
In general, the research on Machiavellianism has sug
gested that the high Machiavellian is a person who has mini
mal affective involvement with both people and ideologies.
He does not seem to be bound by traditional morality and so
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is able to disregard conventional concerns for the welfare
of others.

He behaves rationally in terms of his own adyan-•

tage and does not appear to be overly influenced by guilt or
anxiety.

Likewise, he seems resistant to external attempts

to change his ideas.

Because of these characteristics, the

Machiavellian has proven to be a highly successful manipulator
of people.

He usually wins in bargaining situations and has

been shown (Geis, Christie, and Nelson, 1970) to more effec
tively, and innovatively manipulate others in an experimental
situation.

Likewise, the Machiavellian is able to lie con

vincingly when confronted with a misdeed (Erline, Thibaut,
Hickey, and Gumpert, 1970).
Although the Machiavellian's manipulative tendencies
have been frequently demonstrated through research, there
have been exceptions where the high xMach has not been so
successful.
mentioned.

One such study (Wahlin, 1967) has already been
Similarly, Christie and Boehm (1970) attempted

to evaluate the Machiavellian's ability to respond to subtle
cues in a learning situation.

Contrary to expectation, they

found that the high Mach individual was not able to discrimi
nate such cues readily.
nificantly better!

In fact, low Mach women were sig

Research by Walters (1973) has shown

that if low Machs are aware of the high Mach’s manipulative
tendencies in the Con Game they are able, at least on a
short term basis, to prevent the Machiavellian from winning
in this bargaining situation.

Thus, it appears

that al-
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though he is generally able to succeed in his dealings with
others, the Machiavellian is not infallible.

The present
S

research, then, was an attempt to replicate Walters' find
ings and, furthermore, to explore the durability of the suc
cess reversal.
Statement of Hypotheses
It has been demonstrated that low Machs, when given
instructions as to what to expect, are able to overcome the
advantage of the high Machs in a bargaining situation.

How

ever, it has been an open issue as to whether low Machs
could maintain this advantage, or if high Machs would, over
time, regain control.

In theory, an equally good case could

be made for either position.

On the one hand, studies have

shown that the high Machiavellian is a successful manipula
tor and that he enjoys such manipulation (Geis, Christie and
Nelson, 1970).

Similarly, the fact that he has proven to be

a convincing liar (Exline

et al., 1961) attests to the high

Mach's social skill in deceiving others.

Thus, it could be

predicted that the Machiavellian, if put at an initial dis
advantage, will have both the desire and the means to regain
control.

On the other hand, research has demonstrated that

the high Mach is a very rational game player who does not
become involved in emotional issues (Christie, Gergen, and
Marlowe, 1970).

Thus, one could speculate that the Machia

vellian may not become especially upset at losing.

Simi-
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larly, the fact that, at least at present, research does not
support the notion that high Machs are unusually achievement'
oriented (Geis

et al., 1966), could lend one to hypothesize

that the Machiavellian may not always be so concerned with
winning that he feels a need to exert special effort to
overcome the low Mach's advantage.

It may be that the high

Mach's manipulative tendencies are not the result of a con
scious desire to exploit and manipulate others, but rather
are a by-product of his uninvolved and generally detached
life style.

In this context, one could hypothesize that

the high Machiavellian would not be concerned with regaining
control per se but would continue to perform in the same
rational, detached manner, regardless of the game outcome.
In analyzing the style of the loiv Mach game players, one
notes especially this person's susceptibility to emotional
issues (Geis et al., 1966) and his reluctance and lack of
enjoyment in manipulating others (Geis, Christie, and Nel
son, 1970).

These factors may serve to reduce the low Mach's

motivation to continue his initial advantage.

On the other

hand, although no research to date has been conducted to
investigate this issue, it seems highly possible that the
low Mach's emotional susceptibility will be more influenced
by the experimenter's desires than by his concern for the
welfare of the high Machs.

In other words, it may be that

the low Mach will be motivated to maintain his initial ad
vantage in the games in order to please the experimenter
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and that this motivation will override any distaste occurring
from manipulating the high Machs.
Again, it must be emphasized that this issue of control
over time has been an open one and that it was the purpose
of the present study to make an empirical investigation of
the issue.

Nevertheless, it was the belief of the experi

menter that the high Machs, when put at an initial disadvan
tage, would not attempt to regain control in a bargaining
situation due to an hypothesized lack of motivation to win
for the sake of winning.

.Likewise, it was predicted that

low Machs would be able to sustain their initial advantage
in an effort to cooperate with the experimenter and to please
her.
Thus, specific hypotheses were:
1. Low Machs in the experimental group who earlier
received counter-Machiavellian instructions will
initially score more points in the Con Game than
high Machs.
2. Low Machs will sustain this initial advantage
over time,
3. Conversely, high Machs will not regain control
of the game

consistently win more points

than low Machs) oyer time.

CHAPTER III
METHOD AND PROCEDURE
Subj ects
Subjects for the present study were selected from 184
female undergraduate students at the University of Montana
who were administered Christie’s Mach V Scale.

The possible

range of scores on this scale is between 40 and 160 points.
Previous research (Christie, 19 70b) defined 40-79 as identify
ing low Machs, 80-119 signifying middle Machs, and 120-160
equaling high Machs.

Scores on the present administration of

the scale, however, ranged from 80 to 120 points.

Since al

most all scores fell within the objective scoring category
of middle Machiavellian, it was decided to utilize relative
scores, defining those scoring in the top one-third as high
Machs, those falling in the middle one-third as middle Machs,
and those scoring in the bottom one-third as low Machs.
Subjects were then ranked according to their Mach V
scores.

Those scoring at the high end of the scale were

phoned in order (beginning with that subject scoring highest)
and asked to participate in the study (as high Machs).

Simi

larly, those scoring lowest on the scale were called in order
(beginning with that subject scoring lowest) and asked to
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participate until the appropriate number of low Machs was
obtained.

Middle Machs were selected from those subjects

whose scores were one hundred points (the middle score on
the scale) or closest to that score.

This procedure re

sulted in the selection of eighteen high Machiavellians,
eighteen middle Machiavellianst and eighteen low Machiavel
lian subjects.

The ages of subjects ranged between seventeen

and forty-two years, with a mean age of 19.4 years.
Procedure
From the sample of students given the Mach V Scale,
fifty-four subjects, eighteen each of high, middle, and low
Machs, were selected.

One-half of the subjects in each

group (high, middle, and low) were randomly assigned to a
control group and one-half were assigned to an experimental
condition.

Six sessions (three for the control group and

three for the experimental group) were scheduled, with each
session consisting of a series of fifteen tournament games
utilizing the Con Game (Geis, 1964) as the specific proce
dure.

In this game, three players (one high, one middle,

and one low Mach) were seated around a game board at a small
table.

The board (see Figure 1) had a path

divided into

numbered spaces running from START at one side to FINISH in
the center.

The game was played with power cards, dice, and

individual place markers.

To begin, each player was given

hand of six power cards, much like ordinary playing cards.

a
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These cards were identical for each player.

At his turn, a

player tossed the dice and moved his marker toward FINISH the
number of spaces equal to the higher of his two die values
multiplied by whichever of his power cards he chose to play
at that turn.

A player could use only one card at each turn,

and a card could be used only once in the game.

The player

or coalition of players to reach FINISH first received one
hundred points.

The losing player or players received zero.

Three rules were used in this game:
form coalitions within their triad.
played as a single unit.

1) Players could

Coalition partners

At the turn of a coalition, only

one toss of the dice was made, but each member played a
power card.

Then both moved forward, together, the number

of spaces equal to their higher die value multiplied by the
sum of the two power cards.

2) Each coalition agreement

had to include an agreement between the partners as to how
they would divide the one hundred points if they should win.
Points could be divided any way the partners chose.

3)

Coalitions could be made and broken at will at any time in
the game.
Nine subjects (three each of high, middle, and low
Machs) were run during each session.

At the end of the first

game, two players from each table were systematically rotated
to two other tables, so that all subjects played their second
game in the completely new triad, but again composed of one
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high, one middle, and one low Mach.
peated after every game.

This procedure was re

In the three control group sessions,

the games were played according to the original instructions
(see Appendix C) without further intervention.

The low Machs

in each of the three experimental group sessions were initially
given the counter-Machiavellian instructions used by Walters
(1973) (see Appendix D) relative to the true nature of the
experiment and the manipulative tendencies of high Machs.
Other than this, the games in the experimental group sessions
proceeded according to the original instructions (Geis, 1970).
At the end of each of the six sessions, each subject was
given two hours of experimental credit for participation in
the study.

In addition, the subject who had obtained the

most points each evening was given one extra hour of credit.
Three experimental assistants were present at each game
session, one being stationed at each table.

These assistants

had a thorough knowledge of game procedure and scoring but
were not familiar with the nature of the study or the Mach
classification of any of the subjects.

It was the role of the

assistants to keep a record of the coalitions formed and pointsplits for each game.

A protocol sheet (see Appendix E) was

provided each assistant during each game to systematize re
cording (Geis, 1970).

Subjects also kept a tally of their

total points earned on score cards provided by the experi
menter.

In addition, each assistant rated the three players

at her table for desire to win after each game.
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At the end of each game session, each player was ashed
to fill out a short questionnaire (see Appendix F) .
I

The pur-'

.

pose of this procedure was to provide some hypotheses as to
the players’ rationale for their game behavior, as well as
to elicit any other comments or observations the subjects
might want to offer.

CHAPTER IV
RESULTS

Although Mach V Scale scores for those in the subject
pool ranged from 80 to 120 points, the Mach scores for the
fifty-four selected subjects ranged from 84 to 118 points.
Those eighteen subjects categorized as low Machs scored
between 84 and 92 points (mean score = 8 8 . 8 points), mid
dle Mach scores ranged from 98 to 102 points (mean score =
100.3 points), and those selected as high Machs scored
between 106 and 118 points on Christie’s Mach V Scale
(mean score = 109,7 points).

Analysis of variance of the

high and low Mach Scale scores indicated that the txvo
groups were highly significantly different with p

001

(see Appendix G for statistical analysis summary table).
The total number of points scored for each high. Mach
subject and each low Mach subject were calculated for games
one through five, games six through ten, and games eleven
through fifteen of the Con Game.

The design for statis

tical analysis was a conventional split plot utilizing
three factors (Edwards, 1964).

Factor A incorporated the

experimental-control variable (A1 and A 2 , respectively),
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while Factor B was concerned with the Mach score ranking
(high vs. low) of subjects (B1 and B2, respectively).
Factor C included each five-game sequence (Cl, C2, and
C3, respectively) of the Con Game.

Both the experimental

design and scores for individual subjects are diagrammed
in Table 1.
It should be noted that middle Mach scores were not
included in the analysis.

This was due to the fact that

analysis of middle scores would have resulted in a lack of
independence among the data and a consequent loss of degrees
of freedom.

Since middle Mach scores were not of major in

terest in the present study, it was decided to retain
greater degrees of freedom by eliminating analysis of mid
dle Mach scores.

TABLE 1
Summary of Subjects’ Point Scores in the Con Game
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The analysis of variance for both main effects and
interactions can be seen in Table 2:

TABLE 2
ANOVA Summary Table - Points Scored in the Con Game
Source

Sums of Squares

df •

Mean Squares

F

A

456.333

1

456.333

0.054

B

300.000

1

300.000

0. 035

A x B

10600.9

1

10600.9

1.249

S (A x B)

271580.

32

8486.87

C

19614.1

2

9807.07

1.937

A x C

5181.36

2

2590.68

0. 512

B x C

8016.67

2

4008.33

0. 792

A x B x C

5457.41

2

2728.71

0. 539

S (Ax B)x C

324028.

64

5062.93

None of the main effects or interactions were statisti
cally significant (p

10).

This is further exemplified by

examining Figures 2 through 5.

Figure 2 provides a graph o:

the A x B interaction; that is, of the relationships between
levels of Machiavellianism and the experimental vs. control
group situation.

Graphs of the A x B interaction over the

three levels of C (five-game sequences within the Con Game)
are shown in Figures 3 through 5,
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It was decided to conduct a number of subsequent analy
ses of the data.

Although these post hoc analyses had not

been specified in the original design of the experiment, it
was hoped that further analysis might provide some insight
into the results already mentioned as well as stimulate pos
sible research material for the future.

The following fac

tors were analyzed according to a conventional split plot
design: number of proposals made by each subject, number of
proposals accepted by each, number of proposals rejected by
each player, number of coalitions broken by each player which
served to win the game and number broken which lost the game,
number of proposals made to each player, and response to each
of the questions answered on the post-game questionnaire.
Analysis of variance indicated that only one of these vari
ables, number of proposals rejected by each player, was
within .05 limits of statistical significance (p-C. 01).
(See Appendices H to K for ANOVA summary tables for variables
not discussed in this chapter.)

A summary table of this

analysis is provided in Table 3.
Results for Factor A (experimental vs. control variable)
show that those subjects in the experimental group rejected
significantly more proposals than those in the control group.
Factor B (high vs. low Machiavellian orientation) and the
A x B interaction were not significant.
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TABLE 3
ANOVA Summary Table Number of Proposals Rejected by Each Subject
Source______Sums of Squares

df________Mean Squares________ F

A

30.2500

1

30.2500

6.630**

B

3.36111

1

3.36111

0.737
0.152

A

xB

0.694444

1

0.694444

S

( A x B)

146.000

32

4.56250

It should be noted that two of the other variables men
tioned above, number of proposals made to each subject and
number of coalitions broken by each subject which lost the
game for that person, came near statistical significance
(p<.06 and p <.07, respectively).

With regard to the number

of.proposals made to each subject, results for Factor A
(experimental vs. control variable) indicate that more pro
posals were made to subjects in the experimental group than
the control group.

Factor B (high vs. low Machiavellian

orientation) and the A x B interaction were not close to sig
nificance.

A summary table for this data is provided in

Table 4.
The second variable on which near-significance was ob
tained was number of coalitions broken by each subject that
lost the game for that person.

Although Factor A (experi

mental vs. control variable) and Factor B (high vs. low
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TABLE 4
ANOVA Summary Table Number of Proposals Made to Each Subject
Source______Sums of Squares

df

A

51.3611

1

51.3611

3.629

B

1.36111

1

1.36111

0.096

0.27777

1

0.27777

0.002

452.889

32

Ax

B

S(A x B)

Mean Squares_________ F

14.1528

Machiavellian orientation) were not close to significance, the
A x B interaction reached the ,07 level of significance.

Re

sults indicate that in the control group condition, low Machs
made more errors in breaking coalitions than high Machs while,
in the experimental condition, the reverse occurred--high Machs
broke more coalitions at a personally inopportune time than
Machs.

A summary table for this data is provided inTable 5:
TABLE 5
ANOVA Summary Table - Number of Coalitions
Broken by Each Subject That Lost The Game

Source______Sums of Squares______df

Mean Squares________ F

A

0.0000.00

1

0. 000000

0.000

B

0.000000

1

0.000000

0.000
3.349

A

xB

1.00000

1

1.00000

S

(Ax B)

9.55556

32

0.298611

low
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Each experimental assistant rated players at her table
after every game on desire to win.

Ratings consisted of marking

either ''high,” "medium,” or "low” for the trait.

Although no

formal statistical analysis was conducted on this variable,
Table 6 depicts a summary of the rating data.

Results sug

gest that the overwhelming majority of the subjects were rated
in the middle range of enthusiasm for the game.

Noting the low

enthusiasm portion of the summary table, there is some indica
tion that experimental subjects were less intent on winning the
game than control subjects.
TABLE 6
Summary of Ratings of Subject Enthusiasm
High Enthusiasm
Control
Games

H M

l

;

Middle Enthusiasm

Exper.

Control

Exper.

H M L

H M L

H M

L

Low Enthusiasm
Control

Exper *

H M

H M

L

L

1-5

4 4 6

1 2 7

32 31 33

32 26 20

8 9 6

12 17 18

6-10

7 9 8

6 8 8

36 32 33

35 31 29

1 2 3

4 6 8

11-15

6 8 7

13 9 11

37 34 36

30 29 30

1 2 1

1 6 3

Totals

17 21 21
59

20 19 26 105 97 102
65
304

97 86 79

10 13 10

17 29 29

262

33

75

Number for which no rating recorded:

Control - 9; Experimental - 3.

CHAPTER V
DISCUSSION
Overall, the results of this experiment do not support
the hypotheses made prior to the onset of the study.

These

hypotheses consisted of the following three statements:
a. Low Machs in the experimental group who had re
ceived counter-Machiavellian instructions would
initially score more points in the Con Game than
high Machs.
b. Low Machs would sustain this initial advantage
over time.
c. Conversely, high Machs would not regain control
of the game (i.e., consistently xvin more points
than low Machs) over time.
In fact, low Machs in the experimental group who had re
ceived counter-Machiavellian instructions did not initially
score more points in the Con Game than high Machs.

Observa

tion of the data indicates that low Machs in neither the
experimental nor control group significantly outscored high
Machs during any of the three 5-game sequences (Cl, C2, and
C3) which xvere statistically analyzed.
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Thus, the first
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hypothesis was unsupported resulting in an inability to ade
quately test the second hypothesis.

A similar non-significant

relationship obtains with regard to high Mach scoring trends-high Machs in neither the control nor experimental group ever
showed evidence of manipulation by gaining significantly more
points than low Machs.

In other words, no significant dif

ference in point scores were noted for either high or low
Machs throughout any of the five-game sequences over both
experimental and control conditions.

A number of reasons for

the non-significant outcome are possible:
1. It may be that Machiavellianism, as measured in
this study, is not a useful construct to describe
interpersonal behavior.

Perhaps no real differ

ences between subjects scoring high and those
scoring low on the Mach V Scale were manifested
in the Con Game.

On the other hand, it may be

that the Mach V Scale is not a useful instrument
for predicting any behavioral differences in
Machiavellian orientation if any, in fact, do
exist.
2. The range of Mach V scores for the subjects was
quite narrow (all were objectively within what
has generally been described as the Middle Mach
scoring range).

It may be that the trait of

Machiavellianism is observable behaviorally only
in those subjects whose scores on the Mach Scales
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are more extreme.

In effect, then, it may be

that, due to lack of variability among subjects,
the hypotheses presented above were not given an
adequate test,
3. There was some indication that the number of games
played during each session (fifteen) was too many,
resulting in a number of the players becoming
bored and losing interest.

It was observed that

some players tended to become restless, fidgeting
and looking at their watches, later in the evening.
Comments by players support this hypothesis:

"You

get to a point after awhile when you don't care"
(a high Mach during game #13) ; "Everybody ',s doing
them three at a time" (referring to forming a
coalition of all three players) "so we can go
home" (low Mach during game #13).

Similarly, the

subjects were asked to fill out questionnaires fol
lowing the session and were asked to make comments
concerning the game.

Two middle Machs stated:

"I

didn't care for fifteen consecutive games--too
boring," and "The first couple of games I felt a
need to win, but it tapered off fast."
of one high Mach is as follows:

The comment

"Near the end I

kind of lost interest and didn't really care how
many points I got."

It may be, then, that a lack

of motivation on the part of the subjects had a
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direct influence on the outcome of the experi
ment-

For example, high Machs may not have taken

control of the game (i.e., won more points than
low Machs) in the latter stages due to factors of
boredom and fatigue because of the number of games
played.
4. Another issue related to motivation is the possi
bility that the stakes in the game were not high
enough to give subjects a real incentive to win.
All of those participating were students in an
introductory psychology course who were required
to participate in research studies to earn experi
mental credit.

Although subjects were given credit

for participation, an attempt was made to increase
incentive by offering one extra credit hour each
evening to the subject scoring the most points
overall.

In fact, however, it appeared from ob

servation that this incentive was not particularly
effective,

A number of subjects laughed or made

gestures when the extra credit hour was mentioned
to indicate that they were not impressed.

Simi

larly, it was learned that, with the credit hours
given for participation in the experiment, many
subjects had fulfilled their requirement.and did
not need the extra credit hour offered as incen
tive.

One sub j ect. commented,: thus :

"If you had
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money alongside, it would probably last a little
longer, you could get more involved."

Here, then,

is another issue of motivation which may have in
fluenced the outcome of the experiment.

It may

be that the subjects did not perceive the stakes
as being high enough to warrant making a strenuous
effort to win.
5. The three experimental sessions were conducted
quite late in the school quarter, so that for many
subjects final exams were only two to three weeks
away.

It was observed that a number of the stu

dents discussed term papers that were coming due,
end of quarter exams, etc, prior to the onset of
the games and at breaks between games.

It may be,

then, that an extraneous variable was introduced
unintentionally since experimental subjects may
have been more preoccupied and concerned with
school work than control subjects, who were run
earlier in the quarter.

Thus, subjects in the

experimental condition may have been less atten
tive to and interested in their participation in
the Con Game.

Support for this hypothesis can be

obtained from the ratings of subject enthusiasm
made by the three experimental assistants through
out the games (see Table 6, p. 36).

While "high"
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enthusiasm ratings were approximately equal for
control and experimental group conditions, seventyfive ratings of ’’low" enthusiasm were made for sub
jects in the experimental group in contrast to
thirty-three ’’low” enthusiasm ratings for control
group subjects.

Similarly, it was noted that

while giving counter-Machiavellian instructions
to one group of experimental low Machs, the sub
jects showed great inattentiveness.

Little eye

contact was made with the experimenter and one
subject continued to clip her fingernails during
administration of the directions.

Although the

experimenter raised her voice and clearly empha
sized instructions in an attempt to elicit the
subjects’ attention, no effect was perceived and
the experimenter was left itfith the impression
that the counter^Machiavellian instructions had
made little impact on these particular subjects.
Thus, it may be that an attentional factor was
operating particularly during the three experimental
sessions which served to influence the negative
outcome of the experiment.
Although the overall results of this experiment do not
support the hypotheses made prior to the study, post hoc sta
tistical analysis of several factors indicates that some
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interesting effects did result from the experimental manipu
lation.

The subjects in the experimental group rejected sig

nificantly more proposals (p < .01) than the control group.
Similarly, a greater number of proposals (p<_.06) were made
to high and low Machs in the experimental group over the con
trol group.

Since no significant differences (p = .13) were

found in the number of proposals made by high and low Machs
in the experimental group (recall that middle scores were not
analyzed), it follows that the middle Machs were responsible
for the increased number Of proposals in the experimental
group such that a greater number of proposals might be made
to highs and lows in this group over the control group.

Ob

servation of the data reveals that middle Machs made 69 pro
posals in the control group and 103 in the experimental group.
The rationale for the increased number of proposals made
by middle Machs appears to be that high and low Machs in the
experimental group formed more coalitions with each other
(sixty-five in the experimental group, forty-five in the con
trol group) so that middle Machs, who were now being left out
of coalitions, were forced to expend more effort to become a
partner in a coalition and maintain that partnership.

Thus,

middle Machs proposed more coalitions to both high and low
Machs in an attempt to break up existing high Mach— low Mach
coalitions and become a member of another.

It appears, how

ever, that not only were high and low Machs forming more
coalitions among themselves in the experimental condition,
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but they were also more resistant to having those coalitions
broken up by a middle Mach, thus accounting for the signifi
cantly greater number of proposals rejected in the experi
mental condition--highs and lows rejected thirty-five middle
Mach proposals in the experimental group in contrast to
twenty-one rejections in the control group.

It appears,

then, that highs and lows in the experimental group tended
to be more involved with each other and were more impervious
to the influence of the middle Machs than those in the con
trol group.

As a result of the increased number of proposals

by middle Machs and the greater number of coalitions between
high and low Machs, a significantly greater number of pro
posals were rejected in the experimental group as compared
with the control group.
The greater number of coalitions between high and low
Machs appears to be related to the experimental manipulation.
It may be that following the administration of counterMachiavellian instructions, the low Machs maintained a more
confident and assertive manner throughout the games, thus
receiving more notice by the high Machs who then sought them
for partners more frequently,
Further support for the hypothesis that low Machs in the
experimental condition maintained a more aggressive and con
fident manner comes from the fact that low Machs in the control
group broke more proposals at an inopportune time than high
Machs, while, in the experimental group, high Machs made the
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same error more frequently (p<1.07).

In the control group,

low Machs, who may have been less confident, made five errors
in judgment when breaking coalitions in contrast to only two
similar errors by high Machs.

Observation of data from the

experimental group, however, indicates that low Machs in
this group made only two errors in breaking coalitions, giv
ing support to the hypothesis that they were more calm and
confident (rational) in the game-playing situation.

Further

more, it should be noted that high Machs in the experimental
condition broke five coalitions at the wrong time in contrast
to two in the control group.

It may be that the more confi-’

dent and assertive manner of the low Machs in the experimental
condition reduced the ability of high Machs to control the
situation, resulting in a greater number of errors in judgment.
Thus, although the experimental subjects were not able to
show significant differences in point accumulation in the games,
a definite effect of the experimental manipulation was demon
strated.

Further research is called for in this area.

The present

study should be replicated utilizing subjects who obtain more
extreme scores on the Mach V Scale, in order to more ade
quately evaluate the hypotheses proposed in this study.

Simi

larly, replication with emphasis on motivation of subjects to
win should be undertaken.

In this regard, limiting the number

of games per session to nine or even twelve would be worthwhile,
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as would the use of a more appealing reward (e.g., money) for
winning.

An attempt, should also be made to assess the valid-"

i.ty of the hypothesis that low Machs in the experimental group,
subsequent to receiving counter-Machiavellian instructions,
do, in fact, present a more confident and assertive manner,
thus leading to greater involvement with high Machs during
the games.

Trained observers might be utilized to rate level

of assertiveness of players.

Other techniques might be self-

report of low Machs as well as the report of high Machs re
garding level of assertiveness of the lows and their own reac
tion to the-low Machs* behavior.

Another issue of interest is

that concerning the extent to which subjects must score in the
extreme ranges of the Mach scales in order to behaviorally
manifest Machiavellian traits.

Perhaps replication of this

and other studies using Machiavellianism as the variable of
interest might be undertaken using subjects with progressively
more extreme scores in order to determine more adequately the
limits of this trait both for practical and experimental pur
poses.

CHAPTER VI
SUMMARY
The purpose of this investigation was twofold:

(1) to

substantiate previous research findings that the effective
ness of the manipulative behavior of high Machiavellians can
be reduced by instructions to low Machiavellians; and (2) to
determine if this reduction holds over time or whether high
Machiavellians are able to recover and once more become suc
cessful manipulators.
Fifty-four female subjects, eighteen each of high, mid
dle, and low Mach orientation, were chosen from those admin
istered Christie's Mach V Scale,

During each of six sessions

(three control and three experimental sessions) nine subjects
(three each of high, middle and low Machiavellians) played the
Con Game in an effort to win points.

In the control condi

tion, subjects were given the original instructions for the
game and allowed to proceed.

Counter-Machiavellian instruc

tions were administered to the low Machs in the experimental
group before play began.
Three major hypotheses regarding experimental outcome
were developed:
1. low Machs in the experimental group who received
47 ■
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counter-Machiavellian instructions would initially
score more points in the Con Game than high Machs;
2. low Machs would sustain this initial advantage;
3. high Machs would not regain control of the game
over time.
Analysis of variance of the data indicated, however, that
these hypotheses were not supported overall by the experimental
results.

In fact, no significant differences in point accumu

lation were noted for high or low Machs throughout the three
five-game sequences in either the experimental or control con
dition.

It was noted, however, that high and low Machs in the

experimental condition did reject significantly more pro
posals than those in the control group.

Similarly, more pro

posals were made to high and low Machs in the experimental
group over the control group and, finally, it was noted that
low Machs in the control group broke more coalitions at aii
inopportune time while, in the experimental group, high Machs
made the same error more frequently.

Thus, it appears that

although no significant differences in point accumulation
were noted, a significant effect of the experimental manipu
lation was demonstrated.
Future research in this area might be aimed at replica
tion of this study utilizing: 1) subjects with more extreme
scores on the Mach V Scales, and 2) more appealing incentives
to win.

Similarly, research designed to investigate the over

all parameters of the trait of Machiavellianism is encouraged.
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Mach IV
Directions
Print your name clearly on your answer sheet.
Mark your answers to the following items on your answer
sheet, not in the question booklet. If you want to change an
answer, erase the incorrect mark as thoroughly as possible.
Be sure that you have marked only one alternative for each
item.
Listed below are a number of statements. Each represents
a commonly held opinion and there are no right or wrong answers.
You will probably disagree with some items and agree with others.
We are interested in the extent to which you agree or disagree
with such matters of opinion.
Read each statement carefully. Then indicate the extent to
which you agree or disagree by blacking out the corresponding
alternative on your answer sheet. The number alternatives and
their meanings are:
If
If
If
No
If
If
If

you disagree strongly
you disagree somewhat
you disagree slightly
opinion
you agree slightly
you agree somewhat
you agree strongly

Mark
Mark
Mark
Mark
Mark
Mark
Mark

1
2
3
4
5
6
7

First impressions, are usually best in such matters.
Read
each statement, decide if, you agree or disagree and the strength
of your opinion, and then mark the appropriate alternative on the
answer sheet. Read the items carefully, but work as rapidly as
you can. Give your opinion on every statement.
If you find that the numbers to be used in answering do not
adequately indicate your own opinion, use the one which is
closest to the way you feel.
1. Never tell anyone the real reason you did something unless
it is useful to do so.
2.
The best way to handle people is to tell them what they want
to hear.
3. One should take action only when sure it is morally right.
4. Honesty is the best policy in all cases.
5. It is safest to assume that all people have a vicious streak'
and it will come out when they are given a chance.
52.
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6. Most people are basically good and kind.
7. There is no excuse for lying to someone else.
8. Generally speaking, men won’t work hard unless they're
forced to do so.
9. All in all, it is better to be humble and honest than to be
important and dishonest.
10. When you ask someone to do something for you, it is best to
give the real reasons for wanting it rather than giving
reasons which carry more weight.
11. Most people who get ahead in the world lead clean, moral
lives.
12. Anyone who completely trusts anyone else is asking for
trouble.
13. The biggest difference between most criminals and other people
is that the criminals are stupid enough to get caught.
14. Most men are brave.
15. It is wise to flatter important people.
16. It is possible to be good in all respects.
17. Barnum was wrong when he said that there's a stacker born
every minute.
18. It is hard to get ahead without cutting corners here and
there.
19. People suffering from incurable diseases should have the
choice of being put painlessly to death.
20. Most men forget more easily the death of their father than
the loss of their property.
CHECK YOUR ANSWER SHEET TO BE SURE YOU HAVE ANSWERED EVERY ITEM.

A P P E N D I X
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Mach V
Directions
Mark your answers to the following items on your answer sheet,
not in the question booklet.
If you need to change an answer,
erase the incorrect mark as thoroughly as possible. Be sure that
you have marked two alternatives for each item.
Below are twenty groups of statements. Each group contains
three statements. Each one refers to a way of thinking about
people or things in general. They reflect opinions and not mat
ters of fact, and different people have been found to agree with
different ones.
Read the three statements in each group. Decide first which
of the three, A, B, or C, is most true or comes the closest to
describing your own beliefs. Mark a + on the answer- sheet next
to the letter that represents this statement. Then decide which
of the remaining two statements is most false or the farthest from
your own beliefs, Write a 0 on the answer sheet next to this let
ter.
Here is an example:
( ) A. It is easy to persuade people but hard to keep them
persuaded,
(+) B. Theories that run counter to common sense are a
waste of time.
(0) C. It is only common sense to go along with what other
people are doing and not be too different.
In this case, statement B would be the one you believe most
strongly (or reject least strongly), and A and C would be less
characteristic of your opinion.
Statement C would be the one you
believe least strongly of the three. On your answer sheet you
would mark a + next to B and a 0 next to C.
You will find some of the choices easy to make; others will
be quite difficult. Do not fail to make a choice no matter how
hard it may be. Do not omit any groups of statements.
21.

A, It takes more imagination to be a successful criminal
than a successful businessman.
B. The phrase, "the road to hell is paved with good inten
tions" contains a lot of truth.
C. Most men forget more easily the death of their father
than the loss of their property.
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22.

A. Men are more concerned with the car they drive than with
the clothes their wives wear.
B. It is very important that imagination and creativity in
children be cultivated.
C. People suffering from incurable diseases should have the
choice of being put painlessly to death.

23.

A. Never tell anyone the real reason you did something unless
it is useful to do so.
B. The well-being of the individual is the goal that should
be worked for before anything else.
C. Once a truly intelligent person makes up his mind about
the answer to a problem he rarely continues to think
about it.

24.

A. People are getting so lazy and self-indulgent that it is
bad for our country.
B. The best way to handle people is to tell them what they
want to hear.
C. It would be a good thing if people were kinder to others
less fortunate than themselves.

25.

A. Most people are basically good and kind.
B. The best criteria for a wife or husband is compatibility-other characteristics are nice but not essential.
C. Only after a man has gotten what he wants from life should
he concern himself with the injustices in the world.

26.

A. Most people who get ahead in the world lead clean, moral
lives.
B, Any man worth his salt shouldn’t be blamed for putting
his career above his family,
C. People would be better off if they were concerned less
with how to do things and more with what to do.

27.

A. A good teacher is one who points out unanswered questions
rather than gives explicit answers.
B. When you ask someone to do something for you, it is best
to give the real reasons for wanting it rather than giv
ing reasons which might carry more weight.
C. A persons's job is the best single guide as tothe sort of
person he is.

28.

A. The construction of such monumental works as the Egyptian
pyramids was worth the enslavement of the workers who
built them.
B. Once a way of handling problems has been worked out it is
best to stick with it.
C. One should take action only when sure that it is morally
right.
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29.

A. The world Would be a much better place to live in if
people would let the future take care of itself and con
cern themselves only with enjoying the present.
B. It is wise to flatter important people.
C. Once a decision has been made, it is best to keep chang
ing it as new circumstances arise.

30.

A. It is a good policy to act as if you are doing the
you do because you have no other choice.
B. The biggest difference between most criminals and
people is that criminals are stupid enough to get
C. Even the most hardened and vicious criminal has a
of decency somewhere within him.

things
other
caught.
spark

31.

A. All in all, it is better to be humble and honest than to
be important and dishonest.
,B. A man who is able and willing to work hard has a good
chance of succeeding in whatever he wants to do.
C. If a thing does not help us in our daily lives, it isn't
very important.

32.

A. A person shouldn’t be punished for breaking a law which
he thinks is unreasonable.
B, Too many criminals are not punished for their crime.
C. There is no excuse for lying to Someone else.

33.

A. Generally speaking, men won't work hard unless they're
forced to do so,
B. Every person is entitled to a second chance, even after
he commits a serious mistake.
C. People who can't make up their minds aren't worth bother
ing about.

34.

A. A man's first
mother.
B. Most men are
C. It's best to
lating rather

responsibility is to his wife, not his
brave.
pick friends that are intellectually stimu
than ones it is comfortable to be around,

35.

A. There are very few people in the world worth concerning
oneself about.
B. It is hard to get ahead without cutting corners here and
there.
C. A capable person motivated for his own gain is more useful
to society than a well-meaning but ineffective one.

36.

A. It is best to give others the impression that you can
change your mind easily.
B. It is a good working policy to keep on good terms with
everyone.
C. Honesty is the best policy in all cases.
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37.

A. It is possible to be good in all respects.
B. To help oneself is good; to help others even better.
C. War and threats of war are unchangeable facts of human
life.

38.

A. Barnum was probably right when he said that there’s at
least one sucker born every minute,
B. Life is pretty dull unless one deliberately stirs up
some excitement.
C. Most people would be better off if they controlled
their emotions.

39.

A. Sensitivity to the feelings of others is worth more
than poise in social situations,
B. The ideal society is one where everybody knows his place
and accepts it.
C. It is safest to assume that all people have a vicious
streak and it will come out when they are given a chance.

40.

A. People who talk about abstract problems usually don't
know what they are talking about.
B. Anyone who completely trusts anyone else is asking for
trouble.
C. It is essential for the functioning of a democracy that
everyone vote.

CHECK YOUR ANSWER SHEET TO BE SURE YOU HAVE ANSWERED EVERY ITEM.
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GAME INSTRUCTIONS
The game consists, essentially, of a race from START to
FINISH. At his turn, each player tosses the dice, and moves
his marker toward FINISH the number of spaces equal to the pro
duct of the higher of the two die faces and whichever of his
power coefficients he chooses.
The player or coalition unit
to reach FINISH first receives the prize of 100 points for that
game.
1. The experimenter in charge of your table will assign each
player a set of power coefficientsfor the game.
One of these
coefficients must be played at each turn, and then cannot be
used again in that game.
2. After the power coefficients have been assigned, players
may bargain for coalitions to improve their chances in the game.
Coalitions may be formed between any two or all three competi
tors at a table. Coalition partners play as a single unit with
power at each turn equal to the sum of all individual coefficients
played at that turn.
For example, in a coalition of A and B, if
A plays a. coefficient of 2, and B plays
one of 8,their coali
tion would have the power of 10 for that turn, and they would
multiply the result of the dice toss by 10 to determine their
move for that turn.
A coalition agreement is entered by consent of the players
involved and must include an agreement as to how they will divide
the prize of 100 points between them in the event their coali
tion wins the game.
Coalitions can be formed at any time before the end of the
game. Coalitions formed after play has begun start midway be
tween the positions of the partners.
Coalitions can be broken at any time before the end of the
game. A two-man coalition is automatically broken, if either
member accepts a coalition offer from the third player, or if
either member makes a coalition offer to the third player and
he accepts it.
3. Each player or coalition unit tosses the dice to determine
order of play. The higher player goes first.
4. In turn, each player tosses the dice, plays one of his
power coefficients, and moves his marker toward FINISH the num
ber of spaces equal to the product of the higher die face and
his power at that turn.
In coalition units, only one member
tosses the dice for the coalition, each member plays a power
coefficient, and all members move a number of spaces equal to
the product of the higher die face and the sum of all coeffi
cients played at that turn.
Note that since your power coefficients are used to multi
ply your die values, you will do better if you use one of your
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lower coefficients when you have a low die value, and save your
higher coefficients for your higher die values: e.g., (1 x 1)
+ ( 5 x 5 ) is greater than ( 1 x 5 ) + (5 x 1).
5. The player or coalition unit to reach FINISH first receives
the 100 point prize, and the game is over.
6. Any player may concede at any time.
two players continue the game.

In this event the other

7. All players record their score at the end of the game
(whether they have won any points in that game or not).
8. The enforcement of these rules is the responsibility of
the players, not the experimenter, However, the experimenter
may intervene if she chooses, and will arbitrate if the players
cannot agree among themselves.
9. The experimenter may, at any time, announce a time limit
for the completion of a game.
If a time limit expires before the
game is completed, the prize is forfeited and all players receive
a zero for that game.
10.
The experimenter in charge of each table will make notes on
the bargaining that occurs during the game. To make this easier
for us, please state your coalition offers in terms of the num
ber of prize points you are offering your prospective partner.
Remember, the objective results of your decisions will be
evaluated by the number of points you succeed in winning in each
individual game, and over the entire tournament. The player
with the highest grand total wins the tournament.

A P P E N D I X
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COUNTER-MACHIAVELLIAN INSTRUCTIONS

The object of this game is, of course, to win as many
points as possible. Your best chance of winning occurs if you
are willing to form coalitions, but are just as willing to
break them if rt .is 'to your advantage.
In other words, the people who do best at this game are
willing to go back on agreements, even if that seems dishonest,
and even if it may upset your partner or make him angry at you.
To win at this game, you must put your feelings aside, and
really take a cool, unemotional look at what will be most to
your advantage. We have a name for people who can do this. We
call them "gamesmen." There is a "gamesman" sitting in on every
one of these games. The gamesman doesn’t seem any different
than anyone else, is not any more intelligent or expert than
you, but the gamesman usually wins because he (1) stays calm
and emotionally uninvolved, and (2) he isn’t a bit afraid to
lie or break an agreement.
You, on the other hand, seem not to be a "gamesman." Your
test scores indicate that you do care if you break an agreement,
and that you do get very emotionally involved in the game. You
worry about the impression you make on the other players, and
that makes it easier for them to take advantage of you.
In the games that you are about to play, I want you to
really try to win, no matter what. Watch out for the "games man:" he’11 try to trick you or take advantage of you. Try to
give him a dose of his own medicine; look out for your own
best interests and really look out for yourself.Any questions?
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Protocol Sheet for Scoring Con Game
Game

Table

E:

Date

B

A
■

.

.

.

c

1
_

2

______ ;
___ .

3

______

'4

_________________ 5
6
_____________________ 7

8

______ '
__________ 9
_

10
11

.

12

___________

13

______

14

__________ 15
16
______ ;
_________ .17
-—

ZLZ3—

J

is

PointTotals*
*Remember to note how involved each player seemed during the game (H, M, L).

Record the following:
1.

(P) Proposal to form a coalition.

If aspecific

point split it sug

gested, the number of points the initiator isoffering
is recorded.
2. (#) Acceptance of a coalition proposal.
3.

(n) Rejection of a coalition proposal,

4.

(//) Breaking an existing coalition.
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therecipient
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F

N a m e __________________
Date:___________________
POST GAME QUESTIONNAIRE
Please answer all of the following questions by. circling the
response which most indicates how you feel.
1.

How much did you enjoy playing these games?
a. Very much
b. Somewhat
c. Slightly
d. Not at all

2.

How hard did you try to win in these games?
a. Very hard
b . Somewhat
c. Slightly
d. Not at all

3.

How important was it for you to win?
a. Very important
b. Somewhat
c. Slightly
d. Not important at all

4.

Was it important to you to cooperate with the experimenter
while playing these games.
a. Very much
b. Somewhat
c. Slightly
d. Not at all.

Please feel free to write any comments you may have here:
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ANOVA Summary Table

Source

Sums of Squares

df

Mean Squares

A

2.25000

1

2.25000

0.656

B

3990.03

1

3990.03

1163.085***

Ax B

250.694

1

250.694

73.077***

32

3.43056

S

(Ax B)

109.778

Analysis of Variance of Mach V Scale Scores
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F
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H

ANOVA Summary Table
Source

Sums of Squares

df

Mean Squares

A

64,0000

1

64.0000

2.356

B

0.111111

1

0.111111

0.004

A x B

0.444445

1

0,444445

0.016

S'(A x B)

869.333

32

27.1667

Analysis of Variance for the Number of Proposals Made by Each
Subj ect
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ANOYA Summary Table
Source

Sums of Squares

df

Mean Squares

A

2.77778

1

2.77778

0. 293

B

0.444444

1

0.444444

0.047

A x B

1. 00000

1

1.00000

0.105

S (A x B)

303.778

32

9.49306

Analysis of Variance for the Number of Proposals Accepted by
Each Subject
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ANOVA Summary Table
Sums of Squares

df

Mean Squares

A

1.00000

1

1.00000

0,,667

B

0.444444

1

0.444444

0,.296

A x B

2 .77778

1

2.77778

1,,852

S (A x B)

48.0000

32

1.50000

Source

F

Analysis of Variance for the Number of Proposals Broken by
Each Subject That Were Beneficial

66

A P P E N D I X

K

Analysis of Variance of Responses to Questions on the Post-Game
Questionnaire.

Source

Sums of Squares

df

Mean Squares

F

1

0.111111

0.205

0.111111

1

0.111111

0.205

A x B

0.000000

1

0.000000

0.000

S (A x B)

17.3333

32

0.S41667

A

0.111111

B

\

ANOVA Summary Table - Question #1

Source

Sums of Squares

df

Mean Squares

F

A

0.444444

1

0 .444444

1. 306

B

0.111111

1

0.111111

0.327

A x B

0.111111

1

0.111111

0. 327

S (A x B)

10.8889

32

0.340278

ANOVA Summary Table :-Question #2

Source

Sums of Squares

df

Mean Squares

F

A

0.694444

1

0.694444

0. 893

B

0.69444

1

0.69444

0.893

A x B

0.694444

1

0. 694444

0. 893

S (A x B)

24.8889

32

0.777778

ANOVA Summary Table - Question #3
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68
Sums of Squares

Source

df

Mean Squares

A

0.444444

1

0.444444

0.481

B

0.444444

1

0.444444

0.481

A x B

1.77778

1

1.77778

1.925

29.5556

32

0.923611

S (A x

0

ANOVA Summary Table - Question #4

68

